University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 4

Article 6

May 2022

In Defense of Self and Home: The Problems with Limiting Second
Amendment Rights for Young Adults Based on Their Age
Andrew White

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew White, In Defense of Self and Home: The Problems with Limiting Second Amendment Rights for
Young Adults Based on Their Age, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2022)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss4/6

This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information,
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu.

White: In Defense of Self and Home: The Problems with Limiting Second Am

IN DEFENSE OF SELF AND HOME: THE PROBLEMS WITH
LIMITING SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR YOUNG
ADULTS BASED ON THEIR AGE
Andrew White*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Bill of Rights is perhaps one of the most significant legal
documents ever written, particularly in American history. It contains
some of the most fundamental freedoms guaranteed to American
citizens and is seen by many as the centerpiece of our constitutional
order.1 Of course, the scope of the first ten Amendments to the United
States Constitution have not gone unchallenged nor without
controversy. Several of these Amendments’ protections and
guarantees have been the subject of vast amounts of national litigation,
producing a progeny of case law that has developed a long line of
jurisprudence throughout American history. But not all provisions in
the Bill of Rights have this same rich history of case law and
interpretation. The Third Amendment,2 for instance, has been the
subject of litigation in only one major case.3
Surprisingly, another Amendment that had scanty and
underdeveloped jurisprudence throughout most of American history
was the Second Amendment, which protects the right “of the people
to keep and bear Arms.”4 In fact, until the twenty-first century, the
scope of the Second Amendment had only been explored in one major
Supreme Court case.5 Not until 2008 did the Supreme Court perform
its first extensive interpretation of the Second Amendment in the
landmark case District of Columbia. v. Heller.6 In Heller, a divided
five-four Court interpreted the Second Amendment as a right held by
all individuals for self-defense.7 Heller ushered in a sea of change in
Second Amendment interpretation from previous federal court
jurisprudence, where the right had generally been understood as
*Associate Member, 2021-2022, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131 (1991).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No solider shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law”).
3. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”).
5. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment
does not protect an individual’s right to keep and bear a “sawed-off” shotgun).
6. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7. Id. at 594-95.
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intertwined with only military or militia use.8 Moreover, the Second
Amendment was not even incorporated and enforceable against the
States until 2010.9
After the Court’s decision in Heller, litigation over various gun
control statutes and regulations exploded.10 In July 2021, a challenge
to federal gun control laws arose in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms,
Tobacco & Explosives.11 In Hirschfeld I, the Fourth Circuit held that
federal gun laws that prohibited licensed firearm dealers from selling
handguns to eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds were
unconstitutional and violated the Second Amendment.12 However, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the decision on mootness grounds two months
later in Hirschfeld II.13 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit’s original
decision created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit, which had found
the same challenged laws and regulations constitutional in 2012.14
Although the vacatur decision quelled this circuit split for the time
being, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that “the ‘legal community as
a whole,’ … will still retain some benefit from the panel opinion even
if vacated, because the exchange of ideas between the panel and
dissent will remain available as a persuasive source.”15
This Note argues that despite being vacated, courts should adopt the
majority’s analysis in Hirschfield I. Courts should therefore reject the
Fifth Circuit’s contrary holding. Section II of this Note discusses the
history of Second Amendment jurisprudence leading up to and
including the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Heller as well as
notable post-Heller cases that established the modern framework for
analyzing challenges brought under the Second Amendment. Section
II concludes by examining the two decisions that initially created the
circuit split.
Section III of this Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision to
uphold the challenged gun control laws, while not indefensible, is

8. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that
the “vast majority of circuit courts…reject[ed] an individual right to bear arms separate and apart from
Militia use”).
9. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
10. A number of post-Heller cases are discussed infra, Part II.C.
11. 5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir.), as amended (July 15, 2021), vacated, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021).
12. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 452.
13. Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco & Explosives, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir.
2021) (vacating its prior decision in 5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2021) on mootness grounds because the plaintiffs
had turned 21, thus the challenged laws no longer applied to them).
14. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 211 (5th Cir. 2012).
15. See Hirschfeld II, 14 F.4th at 328.
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nonetheless irreconcilable with Heller. Rather, the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning runs contrary to both the original purpose and central
concern of the Second Amendment as well as the history of vigorous
protections accorded to fundamental liberties found in the Bill of
Rights. Section III further contends that the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in Hirschfeld I is more consistent with Heller’s central holding and
demonstrates a greater respect for constitutional rights. Finally,
Section III discusses the practical realities and policy concerns that
further suggest courts should follow Hirschfeld I. Section IV
concludes that the issue in Hirschfeld I should be revisited and that the
vacated opinion be reinstated and adopted as the controlling standard.
II. BACKGROUND

The Bill of Rights was ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the
States on December 15, 1791.16 The Second Amendment provides that
“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”17 Until 2008,18 the “vast majority of circuit courts” had
“reject[ed] an individual right to bear arms separate” from the context
of a militia.19 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, an
assortment of challenges to even longstanding federal and state gun
control laws made their way through the lower courts.20
This Section discusses the history and background of Second
Amendment jurisprudence leading to the circuit split created by
Hirschfeld I. First, Part A discusses the history of Second Amendment
jurisprudence leading up to Heller. Second, Part B analyzes the
majority’s decision in Heller, which was the Court’s first extensive
look into the scope of the Second Amendment. Part C discusses
Heller’s progeny and the legal framework created by the lower courts
to examine challenges brought under the Second Amendment. Finally,
Part D addresses the circuit split created by the Fourth Circuit’s
original ruling in Hirschfeld I.
A. The Second Amendment Pre-Heller

The Second Amendment has rarely surfaced in litigation before the
16. Bill of Rights: Primary Documents in American History, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 11,
2022, 10:37 PM), https://guides.loc.gov/bill-of-rights?&loclr=reclnk. [https://perma.cc/EK4T-7ZQA].
17. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
18. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
19. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105 (D.D.C. 2004).
20. See infra Part C.
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Supreme Court. In fact, the Court had only meaningfully addressed the
Second Amendment’s meaning three times before Heller.21 In each of
these cases, however, the Court did not elaborate on the scope of the
Second Amendment right.22 The first of these Supreme Court cases
arose from an indictment for conspiracy under the Enforcement Act of
1870.23 In United States v. Cruikshank, several white defendants were
indicted on a number of counts for conspiring to “injure, oppress,
threaten, and intimidate” two black citizens.24 The second count of the
indictment accused the defendants of intending to “hinder and prevent
the exercise by the same persons of the ‘right to keep and bear arms
for a lawful purpose.’”25 The Court briefly addressed the meaning and
nature of the Second Amendment, stating only that the second count
was defective because the right of “bearing arms for a lawful purpose”
was not granted by the Constitution.26 The Court explained that the
Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear and keep arms
“has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government.”27
The Second Amendment made its way back to the Supreme Court a
few years later in Presser v. State of Illinois.28 In Presser, the plaintiff
was convicted for violating a section of the Military Code of Illinois
that made it unlawful for any “body of men… other than the regular
organized volunteer militia of this state, and the troops of the United
States, to associate themselves… as a military company or
organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city or town of this
state, without the license of the governor thereof.”29 The plaintiff
argued that his conviction violated the Second Amendment.30 The
Court held that the law did not violate the Second Amendment because
it did not prevent people from joining either the United States military
or official state militias.31 Further, the Court reiterated its holding in
Cruikshank, declaring that the Second Amendment “is a limitation
only upon the power of congress and the national government, and not

21. Sarah Perkins, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70
LA. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2010).
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1875).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 545 (internal citation omitted).
26. Id. at 553.
27. Id.
28. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
29. Id. at 253.
30. Id. at 260.
31. Id. at 265.
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upon that of the state.”32
The Supreme Court’s last analysis of the Second Amendment prior
to Heller was United States v. Miller.33 In Miller, the defendants were
convicted of violating the National Firearms Act for transporting a
shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length across state
lines.34 The Court held that the Second Amendment did not guarantee
the right to keep and bear the type of shotgun at issue.35 In coming to
its decision, the Court reasoned that because the weapon the law
prohibited was not ordinarily used by the military and lacked a
“reasonable relationship” to the establishment of a well-regulated
militia, the Second Amendment did not protect the right to possess
such a weapon.36 Once again, the Court declined to interpret the
Second Amendment as providing an individual right to keep and bear
firearms and instead relegated its guarantees to the sole context of
military and militia use.37
After Miller, a challenge under the Second Amendment did not
reach the Supreme Court for nearly seventy years. During the twentieth
century, federal gun control taxes and regulations increased
dramatically.38 Challenges were rare, however, because of the
holdings in these earlier cases. The individual right of American
citizens to keep and bear firearms under federal law was simply not
recognized before the 2008 decision in Heller.
B. District of Columbia v. Heller

On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion
in Heller.39 The central issue in Heller concerned the constitutionality
of a series of District of Columbia gun control laws that prohibited the
possession of usable handguns in the home.40 The first statute at issue
both prohibited carrying an unregistered firearm and placed a blanket
ban on the registration of handguns.41 The second statute required
persons to receive a license to carry a handgun from the D.C. chief of
32. Id.
33. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
34. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 178.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 178-82.
38. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348-60 (5th Cir. 1993) for a comprehensive review
of congressional action on gun control regulation during the twentieth century.
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
40. Id. at 573.
41. Id. at 574-75; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (West)
(2001).
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police for a one-year period.42 The third statute required residents to
keep their lawfully owned firearms “unloaded and dissembled or
bound by a trigger lock or similar device” unless those firearms were
located in a place of business or were being used for other lawful
recreational activities.43
Heller was a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a
handgun on duty at the Judiciary Building in Washington, D.C.44 He
applied to register a handgun in his home, but his application was
denied.45 Following his denied application, Heller filed a lawsuit in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin
the city from enforcing the statutes, claiming these restrictions
prohibited the use of functional firearms in the home and violated the
Second Amendment.46 The district court dismissed the case, rejecting
the notion that an individual right to keep and bear arms existed
separate and apart from service in a Militia.47 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms, and
therefore the city’s ban on handguns and requirement that firearms in
the home be kept dissembled, and effectively unfunctional, were
unconstitutional.48
Writing for the five-four Supreme Court majority, Justice Scalia’s
opinion held that “on the basis of both text and history… the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”49
Looking at the text of the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia identified
two separate clauses: the operative clause and the prefatory clause.50
The majority interpreted the text of the operative clause—“the right of
the people to keep and bear arms”—to guarantee the individual right
to carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense.51 The majority also
identified practices in the American colonies and Britain to highlight
the historical significance of the right to carry arms as a “pre-existing
right” codified in the Constitution.52 As for the prefatory clause—“A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
42. Id. at 575; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506 (West) (2001).
43. Id. at 575; D.C. CODE ANN. § 72507.02 (West) (2001).
44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 575-76.
47. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F.Supp.2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 478 F.3d
370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
48. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395, 399-401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id. at 592.
52. Id. at 592-95.
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State”—the Court interpreted the word “Militia” as referring to “all
able-bodied men,” a group already in existence prior to governmental
organization.53 The majority went on to interpret the phrase “security
of a free State” as referring to the security of the people in general
rather than security of the States as an entity.54
After explaining that the Court’s precedents did not preclude an
individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment,55 Justice
Scalia recognized it limitations. He wrote that the Second Amendment
did not extend the “right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”56 Moreover, the
Court noted that many historical restrictions on firearm possession
were appropriate and remained constitutional after Heller’s
interpretation, including prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,
possession by felons and the mentally ill, and possession in “sensitive
places” such as schools and government buildings.57 The Court also
stated that, consistent with its decision in Miller,58 the government
could reasonably restrict the use of dangerous and unusual weapons.59
Addressing the challenged laws, the Court recognized the handgun
ban as a total prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that is
overwhelmingly chosen by citizens for the lawful purpose of selfdefense—a purpose central to the Second Amendment right.60 The
Court also found that the prohibition’s extension to the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most important,
was of particular constitutional concern.61 The Court explained this
statute would be unconstitutional under any standard of scrutiny.62
Further, the Court asserted that it is impermissible to ban individual
handgun possession just because individuals may possess other types
of firearms.63 Finally, the Court struck down the statute requiring
firearms kept in the home to be dissembled or inoperable because it
made it “impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful
purpose of self-defense.”64
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id. at 597.
55. Heller, 554 U.S. at 619-25.
56. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
57. Id.
58. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
59. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
60. Id. at 628.
61. Id. at 628-29.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 629 (citing the importance and popularity of handguns for self-defense as sufficient to
invalidate a complete prohibition of their use).
64. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
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While stating that the D.C. regulations at issue would have failed
constitutional muster under any level of scrutiny, the Court did not
categorically decide what standard of scrutiny should apply to laws
that infringed Second Amendment rights.65 The Court left that
question open for lower federal courts to answer when faced with
challenges to other laws under the Second Amendment.
C. The Second Amendment Post-Heller: Establishing the Framework

After the Court’s decision in Heller, the Second Amendment
remained unincorporated until 2010.66 In McDonald v. City of
Chicago, several residents of Chicago and the surrounding suburb of
Oak Park, Illinois, challenged several municipal ordinances that
prohibited the possession of handguns.67 The district court dismissed
the lawsuits because the Supreme Court had not incorporated the
Second Amendment against the states.68 After the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.69
In a four-one-four decision, the Court reversed, with Justice Alito
writing for the plurality that “it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms
among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered
liberty.”70 Justice Alito emphasized the importance of the right to bear
arms at the time of the founding,71 as well as congressional debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment discussing the right to bear arms as a
“fundamental right deserving of protection.”72 Thus, the Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Second Amendment right against the states.73
Following the Second Amendment’s incorporation in McDonald,
lower federal courts were left to define the scope the right, particularly
how and when the government could constitutionally burden the right
through regulation.74 The circuit courts have since largely utilized a
65. However, the Court did mention in a footnote that permitting rational-basis review to be used
on laws that infringed on Second Amendment rights would give the Second Amendment “no effect.”
Heller 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
66. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
67. Id. at 750.
68. Id. at 752.
69. Id. at 752-53.
70. Id. at 778.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id. at 775.
73. Id. at 791.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The upshot of
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two-part test to determine whether a law that burdens an individual’s
exercise of Second Amendment rights is constitutional.75 First, courts
ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct protected
by the Second Amendment.76 In making this determination, the courts
engage in a historical and textual inquiry to determine whether the
conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection at the time of its ratification.77 If it was not,
the analysis ends, and the challenged law is constitutionally valid.78
If the challenged law does burden conduct within the Second
Amendment’s scope, courts next evaluate the law under some form of
means-end scrutiny.79 If it fails muster under that level of scrutiny, the
law is declared unconstitutional.80 Means-end scrutiny is a judicial
reasoning process involving the analysis of purposes, or ends, to be
served by the challenged government actions and the methods, or
means, chosen to further those purposes.81 When government actions
are challenged as unconstitutional, courts frequently evaluate the
justification for that action and determine whether the methods of
obtaining the purported government purpose are appropriate.82
Currently, there are three primary levels of means-end scrutiny
commonly applied by courts: rational-basis review, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.83
Courts must determine which level of scrutiny applies to a
challenged government action.84 Strict scrutiny applies where the
classification made by the challenged government action involves a

[Heller and McDonald] is that there now exists a clearly-defined fundamental right to possess firearms
for self-defense within the home. But a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of that
right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and how the right can be burdened by
governmental regulation.”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Court
resolved the Second Amendment challenge in Heller without specifying any doctrinal ‘test’ for resolving
future claims.”).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that a two-part
approach to claims of Second Amendment infringement seems appropriate in light of Heller); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th
Cir. 2010) (same).
76. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
77. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701-02.
78. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
79. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016).
80. Id.
81. Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 449, 449 (1988).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 451-56.
84. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F.Supp.2d 294, 310 (D. Conn. 2012); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
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suspect classification, such as classifications based on race or
ethnicity, or where the government action infringes on a fundamental
or important right.85 Under strict scrutiny, the challenged law is
unconstitutional unless the government can show that it is necessary
to achieve a compelling government interest and the law itself is
narrowly-tailored to achieve that interest.86
If the challenged action involves a semi-suspect classification, such
as gender, or infringes on an important, although not fundamental,
right, intermediate scrutiny applies.87 The government then must show
the law is substantially related to achieving an important or substantial
government purpose.88 On the other hand, if the challenged
government action involves neither a suspect or semi-suspect
classification nor infringes on an important or fundamental right,
rational-basis review applies.89 Under the highly deferential rationalbasis standard, the challenged law is presumed constitutional so long
as it employs rational means to achieve a legitimate government
purpose.90
Heller noted that courts should refrain from using rational-basis
review to analyze laws challenged on Second Amendment grounds but
otherwise provided no guidance as to which level of scrutiny to apply
to such cases.91 Since Heller, circuit courts have determined which
level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges.92 The
courts borrowed a First Amendment analysis to analyze Second
Amendment challenges, where the level of scrutiny “depends on the
nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the
challenged law burdens the right.”93 Most circuit courts agree that a
regulation that threatens a core Second Amendment protection—such
as the right of a law-abiding, responsible adult to possess a handgun
for defense of home and family—triggers strict scrutiny.94 A less
severe regulation that does not infringe on the core protections of the

85. Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121,
124 (1989).
86. Id. at 125.
87. Id. at 125-126.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id. at 126.
91. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
92. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Our task … is to select
between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.”).
93. Id.; see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).
94. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195; see also Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 682.
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Second Amendment warrants intermediate scrutiny.95
D. The Temporary Circuit Split Over Age-Based Handgun Regulation

Although different circuits have applied the two-step approach to
many different gun regulation challenges, two cases stand out. Both
cases concern a series of challenges to federal gun control statutes and
their attendant regulations, which taken together, effectively prevented
federally licensed firearms dealers from selling handguns and handgun
ammunition to anyone under the age of twenty-one.96 Below, Subpart
1 discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in National Rifle Ass’n of
America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
which found these statutes and regulations constitutional. Subpart 2
then discusses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hirschfeld v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco, & Explosives, which held the same laws
to be unconstitutional.
1. National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, & Explosives

In National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of several federal gun control statutes and their
accompanying regulations, which prohibited federally licensed
firearms dealers from selling handguns to persons under the age of
twenty-one.97 Appellants included several plaintiffs who were between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one when the suit was filed, and the
National Rifle Association on behalf of both its eighteen-to-twentyyear-old members who were prevented from purchasing handguns and
its members who were federally licensed dealers prohibited from
making sales to individuals in that age range.98 Although the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the laws were
unconstitutional, the district court decided that the plaintiffs lacked a
viable Second Amendment claim and held for the government.99
In a three-zero decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
challenged federal gun laws at issue did not violate the Second
95. Id.
96. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195 (5th Cir. 2012); Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Firearms, Tobacco & Explosives, 5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir.), as amended (July 15, 2021), vacated, 14 F.4th
322 (4th Cir. 2021); These two cases involved challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1); 27 C.F.R. §§
478.99(b)(1) (2012), 478.96(b) (2008), 478.124(a) (2012).
97. 700 F.3d at 188.
98. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 188.
99. Id.
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Amendment.100 The court first adopted the familiar two-step
framework that had prevailed in sister circuits: determining first
whether the challenged law “regulates conduct that falls within the
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee” and then whether to
apply intermediate or strict scrutiny to the law.101 In the first step of its
inquiry, the court looked to whether the challenged laws
“harmonize[d] with the historical traditions associated with the Second
Amendment guarantee.”102 The court performed a historical analysis
and noted that the colonies had many gun safety regulations at the time
of the Founding.103
In its historical review, the court specifically noted that the Founders
would have supported limiting or banning certain groups such as
“minors, felons, and the mentally impaired” from purchasing
firearms.104 The court then emphasized that the term “minor”
historically applied to persons under the age of twenty-one until the
1970s.105 Then, after noting that other states had historically banned
firearm possession by individuals under the age of twenty-one,106 the
court concluded that the burdened conduct at issue—the ability of
eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds to purchase handguns from federally
licensed dealers—was “consistent with a longstanding, historical
tradition.”107 The court explained that Congress’s findings, that
curbing easy access to handguns to those under age twenty-one would
deter violent crime, were in “conformity with founding-era thinking”
in making those restrictions.108 Although the court seemed inclined to
uphold the challenged laws in step one of the analysis and find that the
burdened conduct did not fall within the Second Amendment’s
guarantee, it proceeded to step two out of “an abundance of
caution.”109
The court quickly decided that intermediate scrutiny applied to the
challenged laws.110 The Fifth Circuit read Heller’s observations,
100. Id. at 211.
101. Id. at 194.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 200. Some of these early gun control regulations used at the time of the colonies included
laws regulating the storage of gun powder, laws keeping track of who in the community had guns, and
laws disarming certain groups and restricting sale to certain groups. For further discussion of colonial gun
control laws and regulations, see Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 502-513 (2004).
104. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 201.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 202-03.
107. Id. at 203.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 204.
110. Id. at 205.
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specifically that longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by
felons and the mentally ill are presumptively valid,111 as interpreting
the Second Amendment to permit categorical regulation of gun
possession by entire classes of people.112 Further, the court found that
this categorical ban did not violate the Second Amendment’s central
concern as articulated in Heller—protecting “law-abiding,
responsible” citizens—because Congress considered that persons
under twenty-one tend to be “irresponsible and prone to violent crime,
especially when they have easy access to handguns.”113 The court also
observed that the laws did not severely burden eighteen-to-twentyyear-olds’ Second Amendment rights because they did not prohibit
handgun possession and use through other means, such as acquiring
one from a responsible parent or guardian.114 In addition, the laws
regulated commercial sales with only a temporary effect: any eighteento-twenty-year-old subject to the laws would soon age out of its
reach.115 In light of these mitigating circumstances, the court believed
it was appropriate to review the challenged laws under only
intermediate scrutiny.116
The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged laws passed constitutional
muster under intermediate scrutiny.117 In applying intermediate
scrutiny, the court decided whether there was a “reasonable fit between
the law and an important government objective.”118 The court then
determined that Congress had identified an important government
objective: curbing violent crime perpetrated by those under twentyone, given an extensive record showing those individuals’ proclivity
towards such crime.119 Further, the court found that the challenged
laws were reasonably related to achieving that objective because the
congressional record revealed that access to handguns by persons
under twenty-one was contributing to crime more so than other types
of guns.120 Additionally, Congress determined that federally licensed
dealers, as opposed to other sources, constituted “the central conduit
of handgun traffic” to persons under twenty-one, so the court found
that the prohibition on the sale of handguns by these dealers was

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 205.
Id. at 206 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added)).
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
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appropriate.121
Therefore, the court concluded that because Congress’s chosen
means—the challenged laws at issue—reasonably fit the identified
important objective—curbing violent crime by those under twentyone—the laws survived intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the laws did not
infringe the Second Amendment.122 This was the uncontested law of
the land until two more prospective handgun buyers under age twentyone brought suit against the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives under the same challenged laws nearly a decade
later.123
2. Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco, & Explosives

In Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco, &
Explosives, two plaintiffs, both prospective handgun buyers under the
age of twenty-one, sued the government seeking an injunction and
declaratory judgment that the same gun regulations at issue in Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n violated the Second Amendment.124 In a two-one decision,
the Fourth Circuit held that, “despite the weighty interest in reducing
crime and violence,” the challenged federal laws were unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment.125 Before engaging in its analysis, the
court first discussed Congress’s findings regarding the link between
violent crime and juvenile firearm possession.126 Following its review
of legislative history and prior case law,127 the court began its analysis
by asking whether the challenged laws were “presumptively valid”
based on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms” as
listed in Heller.128
The government argued that the challenged laws fell into two
categories of presumptively valid laws: as conditions on commercial
sales and as longstanding regulations.129 The court declared, however,
that the laws were not conditions or qualifications on the commercial
121. Id.
122. Id. at 211.
123. Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco & Explosives, 5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir.), as
amended (July 15, 2021), vacated, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021).
124. Id. at 410-11.
125. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 410.
126. See id. at 411-12 for a review on congressional findings that led to the enactment of the
challenged laws.
127. See id. at 412-13, 414.
128. Id. at 415-16 (This list includes “‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, [] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.’”) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27).
129. Id. at 416.
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sale of firearms because conditions on sale were hurdles an individual
must go through in order to sell a gun.130 Here the laws operated as a
total ban on buying a handgun from a licensed dealer that had already
met the required qualifications to sell firearms.131 The court then
turned to the argument that the laws were “longstanding” regulations
and noted that the word “longstanding” as used in Heller was not
meant to be a standalone exception.132 Rather it was interpreted as a
potential limit on commercial conditions, “requiring the law to be both
a commercial condition and longstanding to be presumptively
valid.”133 Refusing to uphold the challenged laws solely based on how
long they existed, the court held that the laws were not presumptively
valid and moved on to the familiar two-step inquiry.134
In the first step of its inquiry, the court conducted a historical
analysis to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to
be within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection at the time
of its ratification.135 First, the court identified the Constitution’s text
and structure and noted that neither the Second Amendment nor most
other constitutional rights were limited in application by age.136 The
court also noted that while there are certain things that even those
under twenty-one cannot do by law,137 none of those restrictions
implicate rights found in the Constitution, so states can regulate such
activities more freely under their general police powers.138 The court
concluded that because individuals under twenty-one possessed other
constitutional rights, those persons would also undoubtedly possess
rights under the Second Amendment.139
The court then looked at Founding-era militia laws. It noted that
every state and the federal government required eighteen-year-old men
to enroll in the militia and bring their own arms at the time of the
Second Amendment’s ratification.140 The court also rejected that the
age of full majority at the time of the Founding was twenty-one.141 It
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 418.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 421. The court further noted that those rights that do have an age-based restriction are
typically explicitly in the Constitution’s text, such as the right to vote, and these rights all apply at age
eighteen, not twenty-one. Id. at 421-23.
137. Id. at 424. For example, individuals under twenty-one may not purchase alcohol, tobacco, or
gamble.
138. Id. at 424.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 428.
141. Id. at 435.
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explained that the age of majority lacked meaning without reference to
a particular right, as different rights vested at different ages and
constitutional rights “were not generally tied to an age of majority.”142
Finally, the court looked at the historical development of gun
regulations and determined that there were “no laws restricting minors’
possession or purchase of firearms” at the time of the Second
Amendment’s ratification.143
Most laws affecting minors were enacted after the Civil War, and
the court found that state laws passed decades after ratification
restricting gun ownership, at a time when these laws were enacted to
primarily disarm African-Americans in the southern states, were weak
evidence of the original scope of the Second Amendment.144 Thus, the
court held that persons eighteen and older have traditionally had a
Second Amendment right to purchase firearms and moved onto the
second step of its inquiry.145
The court declined to decide which level of scrutiny applied because
it found that the laws could not pass even intermediate scrutiny.146 The
court restated the maxim that intermediate scrutiny required the
government to demonstrate a “reasonable fit between the challenged
regulation and a substantial government objective,”147 and it
recognized that the government’s interest in “preventing crime,
enhancing public safety, and reducing gun violence” were “not only
substantial, but compelling.”148 The court decided, however, that the
regulations at issue were an unreasonable fit to achieve those interests
on two grounds.149
First, the court declared that a showing of “disproportionate bad
conduct by a group” is insufficient to justify a categorical restriction
on rights when very few members of that group engage in the
unwanted conduct.150 While the court recognized the congressional
findings and admitted that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds committed a
disproportionate amount of crime, it also emphasized that an
“exceedingly small percentage, around 0.3% … of the 13 million
young adults” in this age group committed crimes.151 The Fourth
Circuit used the Supreme Court’s “unduly tenuous” threshold from the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 441 (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Id. (quoting Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 139 (4th Cir. 2017)).
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 444-45.
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landmark case of Craig v. Boren152 and determined that restricting a
whole group that is almost entirely law-abiding because a fraction of
1% of the group commits a disproportionate amount of violent crime
is the “definition of an unduly tenuous fit.”153 Further, because the
congressional findings also showed that young people are
disproportionately the victims of crime, the court found that preventing
them from purchasing handguns implicated the “self-defense core of
the Second Amendment the most.”154
Second, the court found that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds’ access to
guns through licensed dealers was not sufficiently connected to that
age group’s use of such firearms to commit violence.155 A review of
congressional findings and government amici testimony supported the
court’s conclusion that the evidence demonstrated only that “‘almost
all’ firearms in the hands of minors—not that ‘almost all’ guns used
by minors to commit violent crime—came from a licensed dealer.”156
Further, the court found that the studies relied upon by Congress
actually showed that few guns used to commit crime came from
licensed dealers, and the few guns from dealers used to commit crime
rarely were sold directly from the dealer to the criminal.157
Finally, the court was unable to find evidence in the record that the
challenged laws had led to any “meaningful or measurable positive
effects,” which highlighted “the lack of reasonable connection
between licensed dealers and gun crimes.”158 Thus, the court held that
the challenged laws lacked the reasonable fit required to survive
intermediate scrutiny and therefore unconstitutionally burdened the
Second Amendment rights of eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds.159
III. DISCUSSION

When the Fourth Circuit vacated its decision in Hirschfeld I on
mootness grounds, it was careful to note that the “constitutional
152. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the Supreme Court enjoined an Oklahoma law that prohibited
licensed sellers from selling low-alcohol beer to males under twenty-one but permitted sale to females
aged eighteen-to-twenty because the state could not show that the sex classification was substantially
related to road safety. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. The law at issue was enacted due to congressional findings
that 2% of males, as opposed to 0.18% of females, had been arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 201. The
Court held that if “maleness is to serve as a proxy for drunk driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered
an unduly tenuous fit.” Id. at 201-02.
153. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 446.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 447.
156. Id. at 447-48.
157. Id. at 450.
158. Id. at 452.
159. Id.
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interests implicated and the short timeframe in which to challenge the
restrictions mean there is a strong public interest” in avoiding vacating
its decision.160 Nevertheless, the court adhered to “customary practice”
and vacated the case as moot to promote the “orderly operation of the
federal judicial system” and allow for future relitigating of the
issues.161 The Fourth Circuit, however, ended its vacatur opinion by
explaining that the public and legal community will still retain some
benefit from the vacated opinion because the “exchange of ideas …
will remain available as a persuasive source.”162 While the vacatur
opinion technically ended the circuit split, it practically left the door
open for the issues to be relitigated with the proper parties joined to
avoid mootness.
Part A of this Section analyzes the legal reasoning that the Fifth
Circuit adopted in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n and argues why that reasoning is
insufficient to justify the categorical ban on handgun sales to persons
between eighteen and twenty years of age. This is particularly so after
considering both the central core of the Second Amendment’s
protections as announced in Heller and analogues to other
constitutional rights. Part B examines the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
in its vacated Hirschfeld I decision and concludes that the court
employed an approach to Second Amendment jurisprudence that is
more consistent with both Heller, historical gun regulations, and
constitutional rights jurisprudence. Finally, Part C illustrates that while
practical policy preferences may, at first glance, support deference to
the constitutionality of governmental gun control regulation, the more
practical reality supports increased Second Amendment protections
that ensure an individual's right to self-defense.
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning Failed to Properly Apply the Central
Core of the Second Amendment and Failed to Give the Second
Amendment the Same Scope of Protection as Other Similar
Constitutional Rights

The Fifth Circuit in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n correctly cited the central right
that the Second Amendment was intended to protect, as announced in
Heller, “the ‘right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.’”163 The court also prudently recognized
160. Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco & Explosives, 14 F.4th 322, 327 (4th Cir.
2021).
161. Id. (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994)).
162. Id. at 328.
163. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
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that since the time of the Founding, an “expectation of sensible gun
safety regulation was woven into the tapestry of the [Second
Amendment’s] guarantee.”164 However, the historical gun regulations
that the court relied upon in coming to its decision, particularly those
whose purpose was to disarm certain “disfavored” groups such as lawabiding slaves and free African Americans,165 are too problematically
bigoted to rely upon when considered in modern context. Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit improperly emphasized that the age of majority at the
time of the Founding was thought to be twenty-one in order to justify
the categorical age-based ban on handgun sale to those eighteen-totwenty-years of age,166 despite the fact that there were no gun
regulations that restricted a minors’ ability to possess or purchase
weapons at the time of the Founding.167
The Fifth Circuit also cited various nineteenth-century state laws
that restricted gun access to persons under the age of twenty-one to
support its conclusion that the regulations at issue were
constitutionally permissible.168 These nineteenth-century laws were, of
course, enacted prior to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Heller that
the Second Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear
arms, rather than merely in the context of a militia. Therefore, states
had more constitutional leeway prior to Heller’s new precedent to
enact such laws prohibiting individuals from possessing or acquiring
firearms. Given these glaring oversights, it is quite peculiar that the
court in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n was “inclined to uphold the challenged
federal laws at step one” of its analytical framework,169 finding the
ability of eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds to purchase handguns from
federally licensed dealers to be outside the Second Amendment’s
protection.170
The insufficiencies of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning do not end in
step one of its analysis. It may have been appropriate to analyze the
challenged laws under only intermediate scrutiny, and curbing violent
crime committed by persons under twenty-one is certainly an
164. Id. at 200.
165. Id. One would be hard pressed to justify the constitutionality of regulations that categorically
banned handgun sale to groups such as African Americans or women.
166. Id. at 201-02.
167. See Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco & Explosives, 5 F.4th 407, 437 (4th
Cir.), as amended (July 15, 2021), vacated, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021). Interestingly, the same laws the
Fifth Circuit relied on to permit the regulations at issue were rejected in Heller as justifications for broader
regulations. Compare Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 200-01 (majority opinion), with Heller, 554 U.S. at
683-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (using similar laws as the majority in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n to justify handgun
ban in homes), and Heller at 631-34 (majority opinion) (rejecting those laws as not probative).
168. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 202-03.
169. Id. at 204.
170. Id. at 203.
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“important government objective.”171 The challenged laws, however,
were not as reasonably tailored to fit such an objective, as the Fifth
Circuit seemed to believe. While the Fifth Circuit looked to the
congressional record for evidence of increased violent crime
committed by persons eighteen-to-twenty years of age,172 it failed to
consider how overbroad the challenged laws were. The laws restricted
the ability of law-abiding, responsible individuals aged eighteen-totwenty to purchase handguns for purposes of self-defense.173 This
over-inclusivity rendered the laws at odds with the core of the Second
Amendment’s protections: the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use firearms for self-defense.174
It would be a stretch to imagine Congress could limit the First or
Fourth Amendment rights of eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds just
because a congressional record demonstrated that persons in that age
group were more likely to incite violence with their speech or possess
drugs or other dangerous items in their homes. Likewise, the attempt
to burden the Second Amendment rights of this same age group based
on the actions of a fraction of its members should be met with equal
skepticism. And while it may be true that members of the eighteen-totwenty-year-old age group are prohibited from doing other activities
by law, such as purchasing alcohol or gambling at a casino, such
activities are not protected by constitutional amendments, where
protections of rights are not based on age. The Fifth Circuit in Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n failed to afford the Second Amendment the same scope of
protection as other, similarly situated amendments.
B. The Fourth Circuit’s Conclusion Is More Consistent With the Second
Amendment’s Central Concern

Holding that the laws prohibiting federally licensed dealers from
selling handguns to persons eighteen-to-twenty-years-old were
unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit took an approach more consistent
with the historical gun rights of eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds. First,
the court correctly explained that the challenged regulations at issue
171. The Fourth Circuit in Hirschfeld I, finding these same laws unconstitutional, even conceded
that the government’s interest in curtailing such crimes is “not only substantial, but compelling.” 5 F.4th
at 441.
172. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 209-10.
173. See Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 444 (“… these laws over-inclusively restrict the rights of a large
group of law-abiding citizens to target a tiny portion of them.”). The Fourth Circuit in Hirschfeld read the
same congressional record as the Fifth Circuit in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, and found that only an “exceedingly
small percentage, around 0.3% and definitely less than 1%, of the 13 million young adults in this group
commit [violent] crimes.” Id. at 445.
174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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were more than mere “conditions or qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms”175 that would be found presumptively valid under
Heller.176 An outright ban that effectively prohibits an entire age group
from purchasing handguns from licensed dealers who have already met
the required qualifications to sell handguns is quite different from
conditions on being able to sell such firearms in the first place.
Second, the court looked at the Constitution’s text and structure,
observing that neither the text of the Second Amendment nor other
analogous constitutional rights imposed an age requirement.177 While
other amendments of our Constitution have certainly been limited by
the courts irrespective of the plain text, most of these amendments do
not apply only to certain age groups and certainly do not limit
protections based on age once an individual reaches eighteen.178 The
court also looked at militia laws at the time of the Founding and noted
that all of them required eighteen-year-olds to join the militia and
furnish their own arms, with some states even setting the age at
sixteen.179 This alone provides strong evidence that the Framers
intended the Second Amendment to protect at least those age eighteen
and older, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.
In Hirschfeld I, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning was also more
consistent with the Second Amendment’s central concern. While the
court recognized that the government’s interest in preventing crime
and gun violence were not only important, but compelling, the
majority of the panel took issue with the means the government used
to achieve its interests.180 The Fourth Circuit appropriately identified
the overbreadth of the challenged laws, explaining that they sought to
restrict an entire group’s rights for the crimes of less than 1% of that
group, based on evidence from the congressional record.181 One could
imagine the outrage and grave legal concerns that would accompany
legislation that sought to prohibit men, for example, from possessing
handguns based on findings that they were more likely to commit
violent crime than women. The court’s recognition of the challenged
175. See Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 416.
176. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. That list of presumptively valid gun regulation measures
includes “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, [] laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id.
177. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 421.
178. In fact, the Eight Amendment provides greater protection for those under the age of eighteen.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding that the Eight Amendment’s application to
minors prohibited the use of the death penalty for those who were under eighteen at the time they
committed the offense).
179. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 428.
180. Id. at 441.
181. Id. at 444-46.
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laws’ overbreadth is more consistent with the central concern of the
Second Amendment—the right of law-abiding citizens to use firearms
for defense of self and the home.182
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning accords the proper respect to
constitutional rights and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heller. Once another challenge to these particular laws is
brought with the proper parties involved, the federal circuit courts
should adopt Hirschfeld I’s holding.
C. Practical Realities Further Support That Restricting Firearm Access
to Eighteen-Twenty Year Olds Is Unconstitutional

Practical realities, such as policy preferences for enhanced public
safety and reduction in gun violence,183 may naturally lead to laws such
as those challenged in Nat’l Rifle and Hirschfeld I to be upheld as
constitutional, extending more deference to Congress to curb violent
crime through gun control laws. The practical realities of gun
possession and violence in America, however, suggest the need for
increased Second Amendment protections. As much as persons under
twenty-one may be the perpetrators of violent crime, they are just as
disproportionately the victims of violent crime.184 Thus, they are in
strong need of the Second Amendment’s protections. While critics of
this position may argue that the challenged laws at issue before the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit still permitted eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds to
both acquire handguns through other legal means and purchase other
types of long guns other than handguns through federally licensed
dealers,185 these “mitigating factors” are flawed.
First, these factors do not account for the law-abiding eighteen-totwenty-year-old citizens who may not have a parent or guardian from
whom they may acquire a handgun for use of self-defense.186 This
leaves these individuals with an incentive to obtain firearms in less

182. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
183. See, e.g., New York Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843, where the
Supreme Court is actively considering a challenge to a New York law that, in citing concerns for public
safety, requires citizens to demonstrate “proper cause” to carry a firearm. The author predicts that the
Court will declare the New York law unconstitutional and extend Heller’s self-defense rationale outside
of merely the home.
184. See Rachel E. Morgan & Jennifer L. Truman, Criminal Victimization, 2019, at 21, 45, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (Sept. 2020), https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications
/criminal-victimization-2019. [https://perma.cc/B7NB-664L].
185. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 189-90 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Parents or guardians may gift handguns to 18-to-20year-olds.”).
186. This can become especially problematic for those persons under twenty-one who live in
neighborhoods where the violent crime rate is disproportionately high.
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regulated ways, such as buying it privately without a background
check or obtaining it illegally.187 Further, Heller itself recognized that
handguns are the most popular firearm chosen by Americans for selfdefense, and a “complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”188
Depriving those persons aged eighteen-to-twenty of the
“quintessential self-defense weapon” certainly strikes at the core of
what the Second Amendment was intended to protect.189 Finally, as
the Hirschfeld I court notes, many, if not most, guns used to commit
crime are obtained illegally.190 And as young persons are
disproportionately the victims of violent crime,191 it is imperative that
they enjoy the same ability to defend themselves and their homes as
those twenty-one and older.
These practical realities of gun violence in America demonstrate the
need not for increased gun regulation burdening law-abiding
individuals eighteen-to-twenty years of age, but rather the need for
those persons to have equal protection under the Second Amendment
as citizens twenty-one and older.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit did not reverse its decision in Hirschfeld I on the
merits. In fact, but for the failure of the plaintiff’s attorney to join new
parties before the plaintiff reached the age of twenty-one, the court’s
vacated decision would not have been rendered moot, and this circuit
split would still exist for the Supreme Court to resolve. But
nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit’s decision offers an approach with
greater respect for and consistency with the central concern of the
Second Amendment as established in Heller. Hirschfeld I exemplifies
precisely why courts should adopt that analysis and reject the Fifth
Circuit’s holding. It may be tempting to belittle or treat the Second
Amendment differently than other constitutional rights due to the
admittedly foreseeable dangers that come with allowing citizens to
possess firearms. However, its inclusion in the text of the Bill of
Rights, the legal precedent set in Heller, and practical realities with
gun violence in America all signify that the Second Amendment
should be given the same deference and respect as its sister
amendments, therefore providing to citizens, including those adults
187. Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 451.
188. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
189. Id.
190. See Hirschfeld I, 5 F.4th at 449 (finding from the congressional record studies that show only
“11.8% of inmates … obtained their guns from their source legally.”).
191. See Morgan and Truman, supra note 184.
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aged eighteen-to-twenty, the right to defend, at least, both themselves
and their homes.
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